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Abstract
To demonstrate that sensory and emotional states play an important role in moral processing, previous research has
induced physical disgust in various sensory modalities (visual, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory modalities, among others) and
measured its effects on moral judgment. To further assess the strength of the connection between embodied states and
morality, we investigated whether the directionality of the effect could be reversed by exposing participants to different
types of moral events prior to rating the same neutral tasting beverage. As expected, reading about moral transgressions,
moral virtues, or control events resulted in inducing gustatory disgust, delight, or neutral taste experiences, respectively.
Results are discussed in terms of the relation between embodied cognition and processing abstract conceptual
representations.
Citation: Eskine KJ, Kacinik NA, Webster GD (2012) The Bitter Truth about Morality: Virtue, Not Vice, Makes a Bland Beverage Taste Nice. PLoS ONE 7(7): e41159.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041159
Editor: Manos Tsakiris, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom
Received March 29, 2012; Accepted June 18, 2012; Published July 18, 2012
Copyright:  2012 Eskine et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: These authors have no support or funding to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: kjeskine@loyno.edu
Introduction
Recent years have seen a proliferation of research investigating
the relationship between morality and one’s perceptual and
emotional states. Since the influential proposal of social intuitionism
theory [1], numerous studies have demonstrated that emotions
play a guiding role in determining moral judgment [2,3] and that
embodied experiences in particular can be a powerful source of
information when making moral judgments.
Morality has been conceptualized in terms of a purity metaphor
[4,5,6], and a salient set of recent findings involving physical and
moral disgust has provided support for that type of conceptual-
ization [7,8,9,10,11,12,13]. For example, drawing from the
common moral vernacular of expressions like ‘‘dirty hands’’ and
‘‘dirty mouths’’ researchers tested whether the moral-purity
metaphor was in fact modality-specific [14]. Participants complet-
ed a role-playing scenario during which they committed a moral
transgression (a lie) either via email (with their hands) or voicemail
(with their mouths) prior to engaging in a seemingly unrelated
consumer research task where they rated various products such as
hand-sanitizer and mouthwash. Participants who lied with their
mouths indicated a stronger preference for the mouthwash than
other products, whereas participants who lied with their hands
showed a stronger preference for hand-sanitizer. These results
suggest that people feel a need to physically ‘‘purify’’ themselves
after committing a moral transgression.
However, the status of emotions in moral processing is still a
subject of lively debate. Some argue that disgust is not really a
moral emotion [15], while others question whether moral disgust
really qualifies as emotional disgust [16]. The present research
cannot provide full or complete answers to these questions, but it
was designed to further investigate and test the robustness of the
connection between physical and moral disgust by extending the
effects reported in other research [9]. Participants in this study
were given a disgusting, sweet, or control beverage to drink before
making moral judgments. Those who consumed the disgusting,
bitter beverage (Swedish Bitters) made significantly harsher moral
judgments than those who consumed non-disgusting beverages
(Minute Maid Berry Punch or water).
The present research was aimed at extending these findings in a
couple of ways. One goal was to show that the relationship
between morality and gustation is bidirectional, specifically that
processing different moral events can also differentially affect taste
perception. This is theoretically important because the embodi-
ment of abstract concepts is often framed in terms of conceptual
metaphor theory [17,18]. This theory posits that embodied
information (like taste) provides the ‘‘raw material’’ (i.e., informa-
tion) that makes up one’s source domain which is subsequently
mapped onto an abstract target domain like morality. The
relationship between source and target domains was originally
proposed to be unidirectional, such that embodied and sensori-
motor states could influence the representation and processing of
abstract concepts but not vice versa. However, as recently noted
elsewhere [19], some studies have shown that ‘‘abstract’’ domains
can influence bodily states [20]. Those studies tell us more about
conceptual processing than representation, but it is reasonable to
extend this logic and argue that source and target domains
resulting in bidirectional effects are more likely to be part of the
same conceptual representation than domains that are simply
unidirectional.
To our knowledge, no research to date has demonstrated that
physical and moral disgust are bidirectional. A few clever studies
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have shown moral purity effects that imply disgust [14,21,5,6], but
since both physical and moral disgust were not explicitly measured,
the proposed bidirectionality of these effects remains an open
question.
Another goal of the present research was to significantly extend
knowledge on morality and embodied cognition to include moral
virtue. Hume argued that moral judgments are formed on the
basis of both negatively and positively valenced emotions [22]. On
his view, we judge moral events to be wrong when they make us
feel bad and virtuous when they make us feel good. Theoretically, it
follows that instantiating positive emotional arousal in people
should positively bias people’s moral processing. There is little
research on the relationship between moral virtue and embodi-
ment, although other researchers have used the moral purity
metaphor to study the effects of clean scents on prosocial behavior
[4]. To further explore and understand the underlying conceptual
processes that link embodied states to morality, it is important to
demonstrate contrast effects in physical and moral delight in
addition to physical and moral disgust. Virtue is as critical to
morality as vice, and while there is an abundance of research
involving the latter, the former is empirically impoverished from
the embodiment perspective. However, to have a complete
understanding of the relationship between morality and embodi-
ment–and the extent to which these domains overlap–research
must examine a variety of moral event types and their differential
emotional states.
To test the reversibility of previous findings [9] about the link
between gustatory disgust and moral judgments, participants were
primed by reading about morally wrong, virtuous, or neutral
events prior to rating the same neutral-tasting beverage. It was
predicted that exposure to moral transgressions would induce
gustatory disgust, whereas reading about morally virtuous
behavior would induce gustatory delight.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
Sixty (29 females) undergraduates were recruited from the
Brooklyn College Psychology participant pool. They were told that
the present experiment was a two-part study; part one explored
moral judgments, whereas part two involved a taste-perception
survey as part of a collaboration with a market research/consumer
interest company.
Moral vignette manipulation. Groups of 20 participants
were randomly assigned to read two vignettes depicting moral
transgressions, moral virtues, or control scenarios in a between-
subjects design. The two moral transgression vignettes were taken
from other research [23], specifically the bribe-accepting con-
gressman and the shoplifter; chosen because they were judged to
be harshest by control participants in previous research [9]. Moral
virtue vignettes were written in a similar style to describe two
altruistic acts (a generous gift to a homeless family and a Good
Samaritan preventing a mugging). The two control vignettes
depicted non-moral events (a student choosing a major and a
waiter interacting with co-workers).
The order of vignettes in each condition was counterbalanced
and followed by a 14-cm line ranging from extremely morally bad to
extremely morally good to rate the morality of each situation.
Participants were asked to make a slash at the point on the
continuum corresponding to their impressions. These marks were
then converted to scores ranging from 0 to 100, with lower scores
indicating harsher moral judgments.
Taste perception. Following the moral judgment task,
participants began part two of the experiment. Everyone was
given the same beverage to taste (diluted blue Gatorade, 1 part
Gatorade to 10 parts water), which was chosen because it is not
particularly sweet, bitter, or domineering in any other taste. They
were not told the identity of the beverage, but were shown the
ingredients to review for potential allergies and post-experimental
interviews indicated that they could not identify the beverage.
Beverages were administered in a single one-teaspoon (4.93-mL)
dose in a small cup. Participants were instructed to drink each dose
in its entirety in a single swift motion, ‘‘as if they were drinking a
shot.’’ They rated the beverage on another 14-cm line represent-
ing a continuum from very disgusting to very delicious. Participants
were asked to make a slash at the point on the continuum
corresponding to their impressions While it is a possible
measurement limitation that the moral judgment and taste
perception scales were both anchored with positive judgments
on the right and negative judgments on the left, this would be
unlikely to have a significant effect on the outcome of this study.
Further, it would call into question the majority of survey/self-
report data conducted in the social/behavioral sciences. However,
it is worth noting that the scales should ideally be counterbalanced
across and within participants, and future research should consider
such an approach. These marks were then converted to scores
ranging from 0 to 100, with lower scores indicating stronger
perceptual disgust. The beverage was also rated in terms of its
perceived sweetness and bitterness using a 7-point scale ranging
from not at all (1) to very much (7).
Demographics. Participants were also asked to provide some
basic demographic information. They also rated how sweet, bitter,
neutral, and disgusting they found their beverage using a 7-point
scale ranging from not at all (1) to very much (7). Finally, they were
asked to write down what they thought the study was about.
Results
Since none of the participants correctly guessed the hypothesis,
all 60 were used in the primary analyses. Table 1 confirms that
participants actually perceived the moral transgression vignettes as
morally wrong, the virtuous events as morally right, and the
control vignettes as morally neutral, with higher numbers
indicating morally right events and lower numbers indicating
morally wrong events.
To determine the effects of the moral vignette manipulation, a
one-way ANOVA of taste perception was conducted. Results
revealed a significant effect of vignette type, F(2, 57) = 16.43,
p,.001, gp
2 = .366. Planned contrasts on the data in Figure 1
showed that participants perceived the beverage to be significantly
more disgusting in the transgression condition (M=33.10,
SD=19.72, n=20) than in the control condition (M=45.40,
SD=21.05, n=20), t(57) = 2.221, ps = .030, d=20.603. The other
contrast revealed that participants perceived the beverage to be
more delicious in the virtue condition (M=64.60, SD=9.41,
n=20), than in the control condition, t(57) = 3.466, p= .001,
d=1.261. A post-hoc Tukey test confirmed that the transgression
Table 1. Participant ratings of moral vignettes.
Vignette Type Transgression Control Virtue
17.00 (11.21) 56.08 (19.01) 88.90 (10.83)
Note. Mean ratings of vignettes with standard deviations in parentheses. The
higher or lower the numbers, the more the events were judged to be morally
right or wrong, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041159.t001
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and virtue conditions yielded significantly different taste percep-
tions, p,.001. In addition to rating how disgusting/delicious the
target beverage was, participants also rated how sweet and bitter
they perceived it to be. To determine whether vignette type
affected participants’ sweetness and bitterness ratings of the target
beverage, a MANOVA was conducted on both sweetness and
bitterness ratings (with vignette type as the between-person factor)
and revealed no significant differences in either the sweetness or
bitterness ratings as a function of vignette type, Fs,1. This finding
suggests that disgust, not bitterness per se, is related to moral
transgressions.
A regression was also performed to test whether taste perception
could be predicted by moral judgments. Results showed that
46.2% of the variance in taste perception was accounted for by
participants’ moral judgments, t(58) = 7.063, p,.001, b= .680.
Together, these results confirm the primary hypothesis that
abstract moral processing can influence embodied gustatory
experiences in both directions (disgust and delight).
Discussion
The purpose of the present experiment was to investigate the
strength of the connection between moral processing and
embodied experience by determining whether the direction of
previous research’s primary finding could be reversed [9].
Participants were presented with moral transgressions, virtues, or
control events prior to rating the same target beverage in terms of
how disgusting, delicious, bitter, and sweet they found it. We
hypothesized that that those exposed to moral transgressions,
virtues, or control events would perceive the beverage to be more
disgusting, delicious, or neutral tasting, respectively. Results
showed that exposure to different moral (or non-moral) events
did indeed elicit the predicted taste perceptions, thereby confirm-
ing the bidirectional relationship between morality and embodied
disgust. These findings not only bolster the link between moral
transgressions and embodied states of disgust, but also show that
the opposite is true–moral virtue is connected to embodied
gustatory delight, which appears to be a novel finding in morality
research. Hence, the current study both replicates and extends the
findings reported elsewhere [9].
Other researchers recently conducted a clever experiment that
resulted in a similar effect [21]. Specifically, one study showed that
Christians were significantly more likely to rate a neutral tasting
beverage (a solution of lemon water) as disgusting after copying a
passage from Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion or the Qur’an
compared to a control text. However, in another study, they
removed the effect by directing participants who processed
rejected religious beliefs to subsequently wash their hands, thereby
corroborating the moral purity metaphor advanced in other
research [14,5,6]. Although this research presents an exciting
finding, it did not involve explicit measures of moral disgust. Truly
assessing the bidirectionality of an effect requires the use of very
similar methodologies and measures, like those reported here and
elsewhere [9]. Using converging methodologies enables us to
further specify the relationship between physical source domains
(e.g., taste) and abstract target domains like morality from
conceptual metaphor theory, with respect to how such embodied
and abstract domains are ultimately represented and processed.
The present research also suggests that interoceptive percep-
tions (i.e., emotional states and affective information) are
fundamental to how we represent and process morality. This line
of reasoning has been described by others [24], and is typically
referred to as social intuitionism [1,10,25]. This two-stage theory
predicts that emotional states influence moral judgments in a
direct and automatic manner, whereas reason-driven states are
supported by controlled processes, which are not always required,
motivated, or both. Other programs of research support such a
dual-process model of judgment. For example, researchers have
found that negative emotional arousal (induced sadness) resulted in
lower acceptance of unethical behavior in the Ultimatum Game
[26], and others found a similar finding for induced disgust [27].
Together, such results suggest that emotions play a crucial role in
decision making processes, providing support for social intuitionist
approaches to morality.
One could argue that the present disgust-embodiment results
could be explained simply as negative arousal effects on judgment.
This is indeed a valid possibility and a limitation of the present
research is that it cannot disentangle embodied disgust from more
general negative emotional arousal. Research on the modality-
specific effects of embodied disgust and moral transgressions favor
the embodiment approach [14], but no research to date has
explicitly contrasted the effects of general arousal and embodied
arousal on moral judgments/decision making. This represents an
important direction for future studies. However, an alternative
possibility is that emotional and embodied arousal are essentially
the same and difficult to disentangle. According to the influential
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somatic marker hypothesis, emotions refer to a unique family of
representations that carry information about various homeostatic
changes in the body across a broad array of contexts, with contextual
features represented in the form of external stimuli with
corresponding response options [28]. This embodied, emotional
information is encoded and stored so that similar subsequent
situations and decision-inducing contexts will re-activate one’s
‘‘somatic markers’’ to facilitate decision making. Simply put, all
emotional information seems to be fundamentally embodied at its
core. An important consideration would be to determine the
implicit and explicit effects of embodied and emotional informa-
tion, as well as the conditions under which they can be made
salient/conscious (and potentially overridden).
Aside from these limitations, the present research provides
additional evidence that sensoriperceptual and emotional states
share the same conceptual space as morality, although the precise
underlying representation(s) of morality remain unclear since the
focus of the current research was on moral processing rather than
representational structure. Nevertheless, this is the first empirical
demonstration to (1) explicitly assess physical and moral disgust
and delight and (2) reveal the bidirectional effects of physical and
moral disgust. Future research should try to further study and
understand the representation of morality, in addition to specifying
the time-course of the embodied effects reported here and
elsewhere, to determine the extent to which they influence moral
thoughts and actions (i.e., prosocial behavior) in a broader
ecological sense.
The present research is part of a substantial and growing
number of studies providing further evidence that abstract
conceptual representations are grounded in embodied informa-
tion. Indeed, recent research in other conceptually abstract
domains like aesthetics has also revealed that affective perceptual
states can influence aesthetic judgments [29], and evidence from
cognitive neuroscience suggests that evolutionarily older brain
regions (i.e., limbic system) are implicated in higher-order
cognition and judgment making [30,28]. This work thus provides
a framework for understanding how traditionally described
metaphorically-based mechanisms [17,18] could operate in the
representation and processing of abstract concepts.
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